Skip to content
Back to Insights
30 Mar 2026

35,000 Jobs. One Question Nobody Is Asking.

SwitzerlandUnited KingdomUnited StatesAsia (Regional)

UBS absorbed Credit Suisse in March 2023. Three years on, 35,000 jobs are being eliminated. The industry has tracked who is leaving — but almost entirely failed to examine what happens to the careers of the people who survived.

The numbers have been reported enough times that they no longer feel extraordinary. UBS absorbed Credit Suisse in March 2023, in an emergency transaction brokered by the Swiss federal government over a single weekend. Overnight, the combined institution swelled to just under 120,000 employees. It became, by some distance, the world's largest wealth manager, a $7 trillion AUM colossus that now counts roughly half of the world's billionaires among its private banking clients.

Three years on, the integration is entering its final phase. The legacy Credit Suisse IT systems are being decommissioned. Around 85% of Swiss client accounts have been migrated. CEO Sergio Ermotti confirmed in January that a fresh round of layoffs would begin as soon as the decommissioning is complete.

The math is well-documented. Approximately 15,000 positions have already been eliminated since the acquisition, less than half of the internally reported target of 35,000, a figure UBS has never publicly confirmed but has never credibly denied. Internal planning documents reported by multiple outlets suggest the bank is targeting a post-integration headcount of around 85,000, compared to 105,000 today. A further 3,000 Swiss positions are expected to go once client migration is finalised. A second wave will follow later in 2026 when the remaining inherited computer platforms are permanently shut down. On current trajectory, this restructuring will be the largest workforce reduction in the history of Swiss finance.

The industry has spent three years tracking that number, who is going, which divisions are being cut, which markets are being rationalised. What it has almost entirely failed to examine is the question on the other side of the ledger.

What happens to the careers of the people who survived?

Surviving was the rational choice

Let me be clear about that before I say anything else. For most private bankers and Investment Advisors at UBS or the former Credit Suisse, the decision to stay through the integration disruption was professionally sound. Clients needed continuity. The talent market, though active, was not predictable enough in 2023 and early 2024 to justify a move driven primarily by anxiety. And the banks bidding for former Credit Suisse talent, and there were many, were often offering packages contingent on portability evidence that was difficult to demonstrate in the middle of an institutional earthquake. Staying close to clients, protecting relationships, and waiting for the dust to settle was the right call.

But 2026 is not 2023. And I am increasingly concerned that a generation of talented private bankers is treating survival as an outcome rather than what it actually was: a holding pattern. The dust has settled. The integration is concluding. And the question that should now be on every surviving UBS banker's desk, not at their performance review but in their own honest reckoning, is this: what does my trajectory actually look like from here?

The structural reality of post-merger institutions

There is a structural reality about post-merger institutions that people who have only ever worked inside them rarely see clearly. When two large organisations are combined, the hierarchy does not simply add together. It compresses. The Credit Suisse RM who was a senior figure in his market team, well-known to management, with clear line-of-sight to director-level progression, now operates inside a UBS structure that was already deep before the merger and has absorbed thousands of people at equivalent seniority. The visibility he had before does not transfer. The sponsorship has to be rebuilt, in an organisation that is twice the size and still navigating its own cultural identity.

The cultural dimension matters more than it is usually acknowledged. UBS and Credit Suisse were not simply two versions of the same institution. They had genuinely different DNA. UBS built its modern private banking around a disciplined, process-driven model oriented toward scale and institutional credibility. Credit Suisse, at its private banking core, operated with more entrepreneurial latitude, closer to the partnership ethos that characterised the Geneva boutique sector, with more decentralised decision-making and a different relationship between senior bankers and the institution. That cultural gap has not been bridged by the legal merger. It is still actively playing out in how decisions get made, how talent gets recognised, and how the merged entity defines what a successful private banker looks like.

What this creates, in practice, is a particular kind of friction that is hard to name but easy to feel. The banker who thrived in the Credit Suisse model because of his autonomy, his proximity to clients and to the investment team, and his ability to act quickly now finds those same instincts constrained by a machine designed for a different kind of excellence. He is not failing. He is just not fully deployed. And there is a meaningful difference between those two things when you are in your mid-career peak.

The attrition paradox

The attrition data adds another layer. According to reporting by the Financial Times and Finews, UBS's voluntary attrition rate, historically around 7% per year, fell below that average at the start of 2025. People were staying, partly out of genuine loyalty, partly out of caution, partly because the non-solicit and retention arrangements embedded in many integration era contracts made moving costly. That drop in attrition is one of the reasons UBS is behind its internal headcount target. The bank had counted on a certain level of natural attrition to help manage the numbers. It did not materialise at the expected rate.

The consequence for the remaining workforce is a hierarchy that is more congested than it would normally be. Promotion tracks that might have cleared through organic turnover have not cleared. Teams that might have rationalised themselves through voluntary exits are still carrying more layers than they need. For the banker who was expecting to move up within the next two to three years, the queue is longer than the org chart suggests, and it is not getting shorter quickly.

I want to address the counterargument directly, because it is a legitimate one. UBS's private banking performance in 2025 was strong. The bank's Global Wealth Management division delivered pre-tax profit of $3.94 billion, up nearly 14% on the prior year. Total invested assets reached $7 trillion for the first time. Net new money was positive. By the standard measures of a wealth management franchise, UBS is not a troubled institution. It is, by most metrics, the most successful private bank in the world.

That is not in dispute. The question is not whether UBS is a good bank. It is whether it is the right bank for every talented private banker currently working inside it. Those are different questions. And the honest answer to the second one, for a significant number of people, is increasingly no.

The profiles I am concerned about

The profiles I am talking about are specific. Not the banker whose value proposition is the UBS brand itself, the one whose clients chose the institution before they chose the individual, and whose book requires global booking capability, complex cross-border structuring, and the full product breadth of a $7 trillion platform. For that profile, UBS in 2026 remains an extraordinarily compelling place to be. The platform advantages are real, and they are difficult to replicate elsewhere.

The profiles I am concerned about are the ones whose competitive advantage is personal. The RM whose relationships are with families, entrepreneurs, and individuals who chose their banker first and the bank second. The Investment Advisor who was hired for his intellectual independence and market conviction, and who has watched that discretion gradually get replaced by house view compliance and model portfolio mandates. The senior banker who was a known figure inside Credit Suisse and has spent three years being quietly invisible inside something four times the size.

For those profiles, the integration has created a mismatch that is unlikely to resolve itself from within.

The market outside UBS in 2026

The market outside UBS in 2026 is more interesting than it has been in a decade. That is not a recruitment pitch, it is a factual observation about supply and demand in the private banking talent pool.

The Swiss boutique and mid-size sector has not stood still while UBS integrated. Julius Baer grew AUM to CHF 497 billion in 2024, a 16.4% increase. Pictet reached CHF 757 billion in total AUM at year-end 2025, recording CHF 19 billion in net new money. EFG International grew at the same 16.4% rate as Julius Baer, reaching CHF 165.5 billion. UBP, Lombard Odier, Mirabaud, Banque Syz, virtually every significant independent institution in Switzerland has been growing its asset base while simultaneously watching UBS create an unprecedented supply of senior talent, directly or indirectly, through three years of structural disruption. The mandates I am currently working confirm this. Demand for portable, senior, relationship-driven profiles at non-UBS institutions is at a level I have not seen in this market since the post-financial crisis period.

The window will not stay open indefinitely. As UBS completes its integration and the narrative stabilises, the talent supply that has been loosened will tighten again. The bankers who move in the next 12 to 18 months do so when the market is actively bidding for them, from a position of strength, with their client relationships intact and their track record clearly legible. The ones who wait for the third wave of cuts to make the decision for them will be moving from a more defensive position, in a market that reads defensive moves differently than proactive ones.

The question worth asking

The question I would put to any senior private banker currently at UBS is not should I leave. It is more precise than that. Ask yourself whether the trajectory you are on today, not the one you joined for but the one that actually exists in this merged institution, reflects what you are capable of. If the honest answer is yes, stay and build. The platform is extraordinary. If the honest answer is no, or even uncertain, the market right now is in a better position to answer that question than your next annual review will be.

Survival was the right answer in 2023. In 2026, the right answer is something more ambitious.

Keep reading

Related Insights

Suggested by pillar/sub-theme, then market overlap, then recency.

Browse archive
17 Feb 2026
P1 · M&A & Restructuring

UBS at the Crossroads: Succession, Integration, and the Fight for Its Future

SwitzerlandUnited KingdomUnited States

Sergio Ermotti has indicated he expects to step down as CEO of UBS by early 2027. What comes next will shape the trajectory of the world largest wealth manager and with it, the careers of thousands of private bankers across every major financial hub.

23 Dec 2025
P1 · M&A & Restructuring

The Week That Impacted Wealth Management: December 2025

SwitzerlandUnited KingdomUnited States

Goldman Sachs dropped $2 billion on an acquisition, Blackstone aggressively expanded across Europe, and Switzerland finally got serious about post-Credit Suisse reform. December 2025 is shaping up to be a moment you will reference for years.

More on this sub-theme

More on "M&A & Restructuring"

Same pillar and sub-theme, ranked by engagement then recency.

Browse this sub-theme